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NOTES
FAMILY COURTS AS CERTIFYING AGENCIES:
WHEN FAMILY COURTS CAN CERTIFY U VISA
APPLICATIONS FOR SURVIVORS OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE
Sylvia Lara Altreuter*
Undocumented intimate partner violence survivors living in the United
States have limited options for immigration relief. One of the only avenues
open to them is the U Visa: a nonimmigrant visa established by the Battered
Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000. To apply for a U Visa, a survivor
must prove to immigration authorities that she was the victim of a crime;
suffered substantial abuse; and was, is, or is likely to be helpful in the
investigation of her abuser. The statute requires that all U Visa applications
be certified by an appropriate official who testifies to the applicant’s
helpfulness with the investigation. This certification is a tremendous obstacle
for survivors: agencies are under no legal obligation to provide these
certifications, the procedure to obtain them is often complicated and time
consuming, and the decision-making process is opaque. Moreover, many
undocumented survivors fear involvement with the criminal courts or police
out of fear of their abusers and deportation.
In response, survivor advocates approach certification creatively and seek
certification from less obvious authorities. Undocumented survivors are
more likely to be involved in family court proceedings—seeking orders of
protection from, or adjudicating custody and visitation disputes with, their
abusers—than criminal proceedings. Advocates have likewise turned to
family courts to certify U Visa applications. Family courts are unclear on
whether they are authorized to certify these applications and are often
reluctant to make a final decision.
This Note proposes that family courts are empowered by statutory
language and history to certify U Visa applications for undocumented
survivors. After a textual and legal process analysis of the statutory
provisions regarding U Visa certification, this Note proposes guidelines for
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for making this possible.
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INTRODUCTION
During the congressional hearing on the Battered Immigrant Women
Protection Act, one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
of Texas, told the story of Leticia, one of her constituents.1 Leticia was an
undocumented Filipino immigrant who sought protection from her abusive

1. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29
(2000) [hereinafter BIWPA Hearing] (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee).
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husband by obtaining a civil order of protection.2 Leticia’s abuser violated
the order of protection and came to her home, so she called the police.3 When
the police arrived, instead of going after Leticia’s husband, they asked for her
green card.4
The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 (BIWPA) was
enacted to protect women like Leticia.5 BIWPA contains a provision
establishing a new nonimmigrant visa—the U Visa—which grants temporary
immigration relief to certain noncitizen survivors of “intimate partner
violence” (IPV) and victims of similar crimes.6 The BIWPA was
incorporated in the first reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA 1994”),7 a landmark law passed in 1994 to address numerous
aspects of sexual and intimate partner violence.8
U Visa applications must be certified by “a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local
authority investigating criminal activity.”9 This certification must attest that
the IPV survivor “‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful’
in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.”10 This certification
requirement presents a significant obstacle for survivors.11
Regardless of their immigration status, IPV survivors are often reluctant to
cooperate with law enforcement to put their abusers in prison, typically out
of fear for their safety, love for their intimate partner, and practical concerns
about money and housing.12 Historically, law enforcement has not treated
intimate partner violence as a serious concern, which leads IPV survivors to
be doubly reluctant to approach law enforcement.13 Compounding the
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1513(b), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534–35 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012)).
7. See id. §§ 1001, 1501.
8. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108
Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also About the
Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-office [https://perma.cc/5PM2L3VA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing the creation of the Office on Violence Against
Women pursuant to VAWA, an office which has administered $6 billion in grants to combat
domestic and sexual violence).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012).
10. Id.
11. See Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence
25–26, 32–37 (SMU Dedman Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 341, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872866 [https://perma.cc/8PJV-EBK8]; see also Andres Pertierra,
We All Have a Role to Play in Improving U Visa Process for Immigrant Domestic Violence
Victims, REWIRE (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/09/07/we-allhave-a-role-to-play-in-improving-u-visa-process-for-immigrant-domestic-violence-victims
[https://perma.cc/9R9A-LLM9].
12. See Mount Sinai Sexual Assault & Violence Intervention Program, 2017 SAVI
Volunteer Advocate Manual & Materials 84–85, 87, 134–36 (2017) [hereinafter SAVI
Manual] (on file with author).
13. See Combating Domestic Violence: One Size Doesn’t Fit All, NPR (Oct. 21, 2013,
11:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=239129010
[https://perma.cc/4W6R-YTAG] (“It used to be a time where the police would respond to a
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problem, undocumented immigrants are even less likely to get involved with
law enforcement out of fear of deportation and cultural barriers to access, like
language.14 In a survey of New York State IPV service providers in the first
year of the Trump administration, 74 percent reported having immigrant
clients afraid to go to court for fear of encountering immigration
enforcement, and 48 percent reported having clients afraid of calling the
police for the same reason.15
Faced with these fears, advocates often encourage documented and
undocumented survivors to seek relief in family court.16 Through family
courts, IPV survivors can, among other things, seek civil orders of protection,
secure custody of their children, and divorce their abusers.17 Family courts
allow undocumented survivors to control their own proceedings without the
involvement of police or a prosecutor.18 Reflecting these practices,
immigrant advocates have started to turn to family courts to execute law
enforcement certifications in support of U Visa applications.19 The U.S.
government has granted U Visas on the basis of these certifications.20
Some family courts, however, are reluctant to certify U Visa
applications.21 This Note examines the BIWPA to determine whether family
courts can continue, or in some cases begin, to certify U Visa applications.
Clarifying the statutory authority for family courts will allow more
call of domestic violence and they would tell the offender to go take a walk around the
block.”).
14. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–27.
15. ICE in New York State Courts Survey, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT,
https://www.immdefense.org/ice-courts-survey [https://perma.cc/6Q6A-Q534] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018); see also Officials Worry Immigrants Not Reporting Crimes Under Trump,
WWLP.COM (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://wwlp.com/2017/04/04/officials-worryimmigrants-not-reporting-crimes-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/BQ8E-WV2H] (“In Los
Angeles, domestic violence reports are down 10% in the Hispanic community. 10%! Imagine
somebody being the victim of domestic violence and not calling the police because they’re
afraid that their family will be torn asunder because of immigration enforcement.”).
16. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 145.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 145.
19. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, U VISA CERTIFICATION
TOOL KIT FOR FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL JUDGES, COMMISSIONERS, MAGISTRATES AND
OTHER JUDICIAL OFFICERS 18–19, 57–68 (2017) [hereinafter NIWAP MEMORANDUM],
http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Tkit-UVisaCertification02.03.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNT8-BXB7] (including a template motion for U Visa
certification); Memorandum from the Advisory Council on Immigration Issues in Family
Court to Family Court Judges, Chief Clerks & Non-Judicial Staff 2–3 (Feb. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter NY Advisory Memorandum], http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/342742124-U-Visa-Certification-Guidance-Memo-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6G
Q-HCNN].
20. See, e.g., Beth Fertig, Here’s Why Immigrant Victims May (Still) Be Afraid to Report
Crime, WNYC (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/why-immigrant-victims-may-beafraid-report-crime-despite-federal-program-help [https://perma.cc/R59V-9L2B] (describing
an undocumented IPV survivor, Maria, who was granted a U Visa after her application was
certified by a family court judge).
21. See id.; see also FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, ACHIEVING A CONSISTENT AND LEGALLY
SOUND U VISA CERTIFICATION IN NEW YORK FAMILY COURTS 4–7 (2016),
http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2ModernCourtsU-VisaMemo2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7V66-8MJ2].
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undocumented survivors to access the U Visa, escape their abusers, protect
their families, and access necessary support services and government
resources.
Part I of this Note provides background on the relevant social and legal
issues at stake. Next, Part II interprets the U Visa statute through textual and
legal process lenses to determine whether family courts can certify U Visa
applications. Part III then surveys how family court certifications are
currently treated in practice. Finally, Part IV proposes guidelines for when
family courts can certify U Visa applications, and it is intended to act as a
guide for practitioners advocating for undocumented clients.
I. THE REALITY OF BEING AN UNDOCUMENTED SURVIVOR
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Intimate partner violence is a public health crisis in the United States.22
The latest CDC survey on IPV estimates that over one-third of women and
almost one-sixth of men in the United States experience abuse from an
intimate partner in their lifetimes.23 Seventy-two percent of all murdersuicides committed in the United States are perpetrated by an intimate
partner.24 Vulnerable populations are especially affected: transgender and
gender nonconforming people, people with disabilities, LGBTQ people, and
the undocumented are particularly vulnerable to intimate partner violence.25
This Part explores the intersections of immigration, IPV, and family courts.
Part I.A provides an overview of intimate partner violence as it affects
undocumented immigrants. Part I.B describes the importance of family
courts for undocumented IPV survivors. Part I.C briefly explains the primary
avenue of immigration relief available to undocumented IPV survivors: the
U Visa.
A. Undocumented Immigrants and Intimate Partner Violence
In hearings on proposed immigration reform before the House of
Representatives, a social worker from the Shelter for Abused Women in
Collier County, Florida, shared a drawing and poem by one of her clients,
Juana.26 When Juana was thirteen years old, she followed a family friend,

22. See Intimate Partner Violence, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
intimatepartnerviolence/index.html [https://perma.cc/D6SU-LAAK] (last visited Apr. 13,
2018).
23. CDC, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY
1
(2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-StateReport
Factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HB4-A2W6].
24. Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/
statistics [https://perma.cc/TF9A-3Y8R] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
25. Press Release, Nat’l Coal. of Anti-Violence Programs, 2015 Report on Intimate
Partner Violence in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected
Communities in the U.S. Released Today 1–3 (Oct. 18, 2016), http://avp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2015_NCAVP_IPVReport_MR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2CWN9CZH].
26. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 66, 68.
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Juan, from Mexico to Florida, to help him care for his three young children.27
She came to the United States without documentation.28 However, shortly
after Juana arrived in Florida, Juan began to sexually and physically abuse
her.29 She had their first child at age fourteen.30 Constantly fearing
deportation and continuing abuse, even as he threatened to kill her, Juana
never dialed 911 to seek assistance.31 Translated, Juana’s poem read: “I feel
that I am alone / in the world / in the town / in the country.”32
Intimate partner violence, also known as relationship violence, domestic
violence, or dating violence, “is a pattern of coercive behavior . . . exerted by
one intimate partner over another with the goal of establishing and
maintaining power and control.”33 Abusers assault their partners on every
front, including physical, sexual, emotional, financial, medical, and
technological.34 Survivors’ vulnerabilities are also targeted: for example,
people with disabilities, who are more likely to have barriers to financial
stability because of employment discrimination and physical isolation, are
subjected to a significantly higher level of financial abuse.35 As a training
manual for IPV counselors explains, “In IPV, perpetrators have on-going
access to their victims, know their daily routines and vulnerabilities, and can
continue after violent episodes to exercise considerable physical and
emotional control over their daily lives.”36
Noncitizens are particularly vulnerable to IPV. One survey estimates that
nearly half of noncitizen women in the United States experience IPV.37
“Undocumented status gives abusers additional tools of power and control to
keep victims isolated and intimidated”;38 abusers exploit the immigration
status of their intimate partners by threatening to report their undocumented
partners to immigration authorities,39 by isolating them from services that

27. Id. at 66–67.
28. See id. at 66–68.
29. Id. at 67.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 68.
33. SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77.
34. See What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE,
http://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/FW3S-MPLK] (last
visited Apr. 13, 2018).
35. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN 2015, at 31
(2016),
http://avp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2015_ncavp_lgbtqipvreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Z8J-7P4D].
36. SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77.
37. See Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 446 (2005) [hereinafter VAWA 2005 Hearing].
38. Ashmar Mandou, Advocates Call for Passage SB 32, LAWNDALE NEWS (Oct. 19,
2017),
http://www.lawndalenews.com/2017/10/advocates-call-for-passage-sb-32/
[https://perma.cc/L46Q-KR2W] (quoting a representative of Mujeres Latinas en Acción).
39. See, e.g., Shannon Dooling, ‘I Was Afraid of Him and of Immigration’: Domestic
Violence Survivors Take Chance Applying for Special Visa, WBUR (Sept. 12, 2017),
http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/09/12/increase-u-visa-applications [https://perma.cc/PHG5QV9D] (quoting an undocumented survivor as saying, “I was afraid of both of them—of him
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would help them acclimate to the United States, and by controlling their
immigration applications.40
Often far from their support systems and unable to speak English,
undocumented survivors are cut off from social services and legal
assistance.41 Undocumented survivors frequently fear seeking the assistance
of the police or the courts because of the risk of deportation and
In hearings on the 2005
misunderstandings about their rights.42
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 2005”), Legal
Momentum, a nonprofit legal services provider, submitted a compendium of
stories of noncitizen IPV survivors to Congress, which reflected this fear.43
These stories demonstrated that while many survivors were reluctant to
involve police,44 many sought refuge in domestic-violence shelters or with
other support services,45 and nearly all went to family court to seek orders of
protection46 or to win custody or support for their children.47
B. Family Courts and Undocumented
Intimate Partner Violence Survivors
Intimate partner violence is a crime.48 However, IPV survivors are often
reluctant to involve criminal courts for several reasons. Survivors often fear
the retribution of their abusers; and often they still love their abusers—
frequently their spouse, coparent, and someone on whom they are financially
reliant—and do not want them to be punished.49 Undocumented survivors
are especially reluctant to approach criminal authorities because they fear
deportation. Thus, advocates often suggest family law proceedings for
undocumented survivors to seek relief from their abusers without risking
deportation or criminal punishment.50
and of immigration . . . . [A]ny time I’d confront him, he’d tell me he was calling immigration
and I was afraid they’d deport me”).
40. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–27; Abuse & Immigrants, NAT’L DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
HOTLINE,
http://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-and-immigrants
[https://perma.cc/9YNA-3KNC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018); ICE in New York State Courts
Survey, supra note 15.
41. See VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 446; SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 25–
27; cf. Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Status in a State of Emergency: U Visas and the Flint Water
Crisis, 20 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 121, 133–42 (2017) (describing the obstacles for
undocumented people to access assistance during natural disasters, like language barriers,
ineligibility for government services, and fear of deportation).
42. See LETI VOLPP, WORKING WITH BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN: A HANDBOOK TO
MAKE SERVICES ACCESSIBLE 16–17, 28–29 (Leni Marin, ed., 1995).
43. See VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 391–416.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 398 (Madeline); id. at 400 (Mona).
46. See, e.g., id. at 393 (Sara); id. at 393–94 (Yesenia); id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–
98 (Ana).
47. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–98 (Ana); id. at 400 (Mona).
48. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,174 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Senator Patty
Murray) (“I am very proud to have worked to pass the Violence Against Women Act because,
for the first time, our Nation recognized domestic violence for what it is—a violent crime and
a public health threat.”).
49. See SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 84–85, 87, 134–36.
50. See id. at 145; VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30–34.
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Family law is almost entirely the province of state courts.51 In medieval
England, family law was the province of the church, and ecclesiastical courts
had jurisdiction over “all manners of punishment and determination of pleas
which touch matrimony or testament . . . and also of all those other things
which touch the correction of the soul.”52 This meant that all suits concerning
marriage, divorce, legitimacy of children, establishment of paternity, and
domestic support were all brought in ecclesiastical courts.53 Today, these
cases are filed in a state civil court, depending on the structure of the state
court system.
Most family law cases are heard in state courts of general jurisdiction.54
Some jurisdictions assign all family law cases to special divisions within
those courts.55 In other states, family law cases are heard within a separate,
general court of equity.56 Beginning in the twentieth century, states began to
create specialized family courts to hear every kind of family case.57 This
Note will use the term “family court” to describe any of these situations: a
judge in a court of general jurisdiction or chancery adjudicating a family law
proceeding, a family division judge, or the judge of a family court.
Intimate partner violence figures prominently in many family law
proceedings. Undocumented IPV survivors can divorce their abusers in
family court,58 which allows them to sever legal and financial ties with their

51. There is a “domestic relation exception” to federal diversity jurisdiction. Meredith
Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 140
(2009). This exception remains even though the doctrine is in “disarray,” id. at 158–59, and
marriage and intimate relationships have increasingly been subject to federal litigation, see,
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex marriage); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (same).
52. SELDEN SOC’Y, THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 74 (Margaret
McGlynn ed., 2015).
53. See R.H. HELMHOLTZ, THE CANON LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597
TO THE 1640S, at 523–25, 540, 556–62 (2004) (describing ecclesiastical jurisdiction). These
ecclesiastical courts were presided over by clergy and governed by canon law. See id. at 475–
76. These religious influences are reflected in modern American jurisprudence about family.
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it
embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”).
54. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAWRENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW 28 (2002); see, e.g., General Information, KAN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/general-information/default.asp [https://perma.cc/GK
75-7E4P] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing how Kansas district courts possess “general
original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases, including divorce and domestic
relations”).
55. See, e.g., L.A. CTY. SUP. CT. LOCAL R. 5.2 (“All matters arising under the Family
Code . . . are assigned to the Family Law Division.”).
56. WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 54, at 28. For example, in Mississippi, the chancery
court has jurisdiction over “domestic matters including adoptions, custody disputes and
divorces.” About the Courts, ST. MISS. JUDICIARY, https://courts.ms.gov/aboutcourts/
aboutcourts.html [https://perma.cc/P4U2-BKF4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
57. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 7, 1009–10 (2006); see,
e.g., Family Courts, HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/
family/family_courts [https://perma.cc/JE7T-QWHF] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
58. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 32–33; see, e.g., supra notes 54, 56.
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abusive partners.59 Survivors can also petition for child custody and
visitation in family court to protect their children from their abusers.60 And
family courts are a place where survivors can petition for civil orders of
protection.61 Orders of protection come in several forms: they can require
the respondent to stop abusing the petitioner; to stay away from the petitioner
and suspend all contact, including indirect contact; or even to leave the family
home—all under threat of criminal penalties.62
C. Immigration Relief for Intimate Partner Violence Survivors
Family courts are available to litigants irrespective of immigration status.63
However, immigration relief for the undocumented already residing in the
United States is limited. There are two types of visas available to noncitizens:
immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visas.64 Immigrant visas are generally
available only to noncitizens who are sponsored by an employer65 or a family
member who is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident,66 or through programs
like the visa lottery.67 Nonimmigrant visas are generally available to
travelers, students, reporters, and certain types of professionals like investors,
athletes, clergy, and nurses, as well as other workers.68
To be granted either type of visa, a noncitizen must be “admissible” to the
United States.69 To be admissible, one must meet a series of stringent
requirements. Noncitizens must be healthy;70 have, at most, minimal
criminal records;71 and be able to support themselves financially in the
United States.72 One of the most significant barriers to admission for

59. See Sanctuary for Families, 2017 Autumn Uncontested Divorce Project Orientation
26 (2017) (on file with author) (“[D]ivorce allows [survivors] to reclaim their previous identity
which was systematically repressed by their abuser and empowers them by allowing them to
break free from the abuser.”).
60. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 33–34.
61. See id. at 30–32.
62. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2018) (setting forth the possibilities
for orders of protection in New York State family courts).
63. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30.
64. See Directory of Visa Categories, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/
content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/all-visa-categories.html
[https://perma.cc/SMR4-2E9W] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
65. 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 502.1-1(B) (2018) [hereinafter
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
MANUAL],
https://fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=09FAM
[https://perma.cc/W7AG-NSW6].
66. Id.
67. Id.; see id. § 502.6. There are pending executive proposals to eliminate this program.
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2017 11:33 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/926155393490878464 [https://perma.cc/5793MGT5] (“I am calling on Congress to TERMINATE the diversity visa lottery program that
presents significant vulnerabilities to our national security.”).
68. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 65, § 402.1.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012).
70. See id. § 1182(a)(1).
71. See id. § 1182(a)(2)–(3), (6), (10).
72. See id. § 1182(a)(4).
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noncitizens is that unlawful presence can bar immigration relief for years,73
which means that anyone who comes to the United States without
documentation or who overstays a student or tourist visa is de facto ineligible
for a visa.
The U Visa was novel because the statute allows certain grounds of
inadmissibility to be waived, which means that IPV survivors who are
otherwise ineligible for visas because they have a criminal record or because
they came to or stayed in the United States without documentation can still
be granted a U Visa.74 Thus, for many undocumented IPV survivors, the
U Visa is their only option for legal status.
The BIWPA established U Visa criteria by amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),75 the primary statutory source of immigration law in
the United States.76 To qualify, an applicant must have been the victim of
certain crimes, like domestic abuse and involuntary servitude; been
substantially harmed; and aided a “law enforcement official,” prosecutor,
judge, immigration authority, or another “local authorit[y]” investigating or
prosecuting criminal activity.77 A U Visa holder is authorized to work in the
United States for four years78 and has the opportunity to become a permanent
resident after three years.79
U Visas are administered by the United States Customs and Immigration
Service (USCIS).80 USCIS is a division of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) tasked with processing citizenship applications, managing
naturalization procedures, issuing immigrant and nonimmigrant visas,81 and
handling various U.S. humanitarian programs.82 USCIS’s humanitarian
programs grant specific immigration relief to specific classes of noncitizens,
like asylum to refugees83 or expedited processing of applications for foreign
nationals stranded in the United States because of a natural disaster.84 The
73. See id. § 1182(a)(9) (establishing the three- and ten-year bars for “unlawful
presence”).
74. Ann Benson & Jonathan Moore, A Practice Guide for Representing U Visa Applicants
with Criminal Convictions or Criminal History, ASISTA 4, http://www.asistahelp.org/
documents/resources/annie_Us_final_FA7D9E90456F8.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4BF-Q9CP]
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).
75. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1513(b)–(d), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534–36 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15),
1182, 1184).
76. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.02(3)(c)
(2017).
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p) (2012).
78. See id. § 1184(o).
79. See id. § 1255(l).
80. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1).
81. See id. § 1.02(2).
82. Humanitarian, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian [https://perma.cc/VKF9-4C99] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
83. Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum [https://perma.cc/BV7Y-6BEJ] (last visited Apr. 13,
2018).
84. Tips for Foreign Nationals in the United States Impacted by Civil Unrest or Natural
Disasters in Their Home Country, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/tips-foreign-nationals-united-states-impacted-civil-unrest-
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U Visa is one of these programs.85 The law authorizes USCIS to grant ten
thousand U Visas annually.86
USCIS has issued formal and informal guidance with respect to the U Visa
process. A federal regulation (the “U Visa Regulation”)87 establishes the
required elements of a U Visa application: a Petition for U Nonimmigrant
Status (form I-918), a U Nonimmigrant Status Certification (form I-918,
Supplement B), a personal statement, and biometric information.88
Supplement B is the form of the required law enforcement certification
indicating to USCIS that the applicant “has been, is being, or is likely to be
helpful to an investigation or prosecution of . . . qualifying criminal
activity.”89 USCIS has also issued an informal resource guide (“Resource
Guide”),90 which is intended to explain the U Visa certification requirement
to law enforcement agencies.91 The Resource Guide explains that while
certifying an application does not automatically guarantee the applicant a
U Visa, it is required for a U Visa petition to be considered.92
This certification is one of the most difficult elements for survivors to
obtain.93 Many agencies have instituted complicated, opaque procedures,
have long processing times, and some refuse to certify without explanation.94
In response, nonprofit organizations have long advocated for a broad and
creative approach to the pursuit of U Visa applications.95
or-natural-disasters-their-home-country [https://perma.cc/2XJF-ZZNW] (last visited Apr. 13,
2018); see, e.g., Press Release, USCIS, USCIS Reminds Filipino Nationals Impacted by
Typhoon Haiyan of Available Immigration Relief Measures (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-reminds-filipino-nationals-impacted-typhoonhaiyan-available-immigration-relief-measures [https://perma.cc/2VHY-SYED] (reminding
victims of the 2013 typhoon “Yolanda” in the Philippines of immigration relief available).
85. See Humanitarian, supra note 82 (describing the visas for “Victims of Human
Trafficking & Other Crimes”).
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2012).
87. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2018).
88. See id. § 214.14(c). The forms and instructions are available at I-918, Petition for U
Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/i-918
[https://perma.cc/GD9J-U2TR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
89. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i).
90. See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U AND T VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE
GUIDE (2016) [hereinafter DHS RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/U-and-T-Visa-Law-Enforcement-Resource%20Guide_1.4.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7WM-SRF8].
91. See id. at 3.
92. Id. at 6 (“[B]y signing a U Visa certification, the certifying agency . . . is not
sponsoring or endorsing the victim for a U Visa, and the completed certification does not
guarantee that USCIS will approve the U Visa petition.” (emphasis removed)).
93. See supra note 11.
94. See Nanasi, supra note 11 (manuscript at 32–33); Abuelita Genoveva Sues Department
of Homeland Security as Part of Effort to Stop Her Deportation, OCAD (Sept. 18, 2017),
http://organizedcommunities.org/abuelita-genoveva-sues-department-of-homeland-securityas-part-of-effort-to-stop-her-deportation [https://perma.cc/NQM7-WF66] (“Delays in the
USCIS adjudication process have caused U Visa applicants to wait as much as three years for
decisions on their applications.”).
95. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, RESOURCE LIST: WORKING MORE
EFFECTIVELY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN U VISA CERTIFICATIONS (2015),
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/LEAs_and_U_visas_Resource_List__Mar_0
D3F1275EDAC4.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3YZ-8GR3]; NIWPA MEMORANDUM, supra note
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After submission, USCIS officials engage in an intense review process96
to determine whether to issue a U Visa.97 The decision is reviewable de novo
by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).98 AAO decisions are final.99
II. INTERPRETING THE U VISA STATUTES
USCIS is authorized to grant U Visas where (1) the survivor “has suffered
substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of
criminal activity”;100 (2) the survivor “has been helpful, is being helpful, or
is likely to be helpful to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, to
a Federal, State, or local prosecutor, to a Federal or State judge, to [DHS], or
to other Federal, State, or local authorities investigating or prosecuting
criminal activity”; and (3) “the criminal activity . . . violated the laws of the
United States or occurred in the United States.”101 To enable this fact-finding
process, a U Visa petition must include, as set forth in the BIWPA:
[A] certification from a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official,
prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating
19; see also N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, IMMIGRATION AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A SHORT GUIDE FOR NEW YORK STATE JUDGES 3 (2009),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/pdfs/ImmigrationandDomesticViolence.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2L3Y-96Q4] (“Cooperating in an abuse and neglect proceeding or
giving evidence in a family offense case in Family Court, for example, may qualify as assisting
with the investigation of a crime.”). Organizations also have a long-standing practice of
sharing information about the certification requirements promulgated by different agencies.
See, e.g., ICWC U Visa Zoho Database, IMMIGR. CTR. FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN,
http://icwclaw.org/services-available/icwc-u-travel-and-certifier-database/ [https://perma.cc/
DHF9-KBQT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (providing a regularly updated, members-only
database that currently lists 983 agencies that have certified U Visa applications, ranging from
police departments, district attorneys’ offices, state departments of labor, and local child
protective services agencies).
96. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5. For example, USCIS fingerprints and
conducts background checks on all applicants. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(3) (2018). USCIS
may also contact the Supplement B signatory for additional information. DHS RESOURCE
GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5.
97. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1).
98. USCIS, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 1.4(a), 3.4 (2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/AAO/Practice%20Manual/AAO_Prac
tice_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUT5-2CAH].
99. See id. §§ 3.2(d)–(e), 3.14. While an applicant may seek judicial review under the
Administrative Procedures Act, any review will likely be highly deferential. See, e.g.,
Bazaldua-Hernandez v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1383, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149283, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (describing the standard of review in a petition for judicial review of an
AAO denial of a U Visa).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I) (2012). Qualifying criminal activity is defined as:
[I]nvolving one or more of the following or any similar activity in violation of
Federal, State, or local criminal law: rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic
violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation;
female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave
trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment;
blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering;
obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any
of the above mentioned crimes.
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).
101. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(IV).
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criminal activity . . . . This certification shall state that the alien “has been
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation or
prosecution of criminal activity.102

This Part demonstrates that this provision (the “Certification Statute”)
authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications. This Part interprets
the Certification Statute using relevant tools of statutory interpretation and
construction.
The tools of statutory interpretation are plentiful and heavily debated.103
This Part analyzes the Certification Statute using two general categories of
interpretative tools: textual and legal process.104 Part II.A will engage in a
textual analysis of the Certification Statute, and Part II.B engages in a legal
process analysis, examining the BIWPA’s legislative and statutory history.
A. A Textual Analysis of the BIWPA
Courts and scholars generally agree that any analysis of the law should
begin with the text.105 However, the appropriate approach to the text is less
certain, with different judges advocating for different methods.106 This Note
utilizes several of these methods to determine that family courts are
authorized by the Certification Statute to certify U Visa applications.
The Certification Statute allows for “a certification from a . . . State . . .
judge . . . that the alien ‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be
helpful’ in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.”107 There
are two questions raised by this text: (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes
state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must
be investigating criminal activity in order to certify.
1. Family Court Judges as State Judges
This first question, whether “State . . . judge” includes state family court
judges, can be formulated another way: Does the text surrounding “State . . .
judge” narrow the meaning of the term and, thus, exclude family court
judges? The key to understanding text is understanding the ordinary meaning
of its words: how a reasonable person would read the word in its everyday
context.108 Justice Antonin Scalia described this as “whether you could use
the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you

102. Id. § 1184(p)(1).
103. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
104. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J.
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 424, 644 (5th ed. 2014).
105. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 26 (2016) (“Like Justice Scalia, we
are all textualists: The starting point and usually the answer to a statutory problem is a fair
reading of the statutory text on point.”).
106. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 645–90.
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1).
108. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 69–71 (2012).
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funny.”109 If family law is always the jurisdiction of the states,110 it follows
that family court judges are always state judges. In its everyday context, a
family court judge is a state judge, and this designation would draw no
strange looks over a martini.111
However, plain meaning is not always dispositive. For example, in Yates
v. United States,112 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a fish was a
tangible object and decided, all plain meaning and dictionary definitions
aside, that a fish was not a tangible object within the meaning of the statute
in question.113 Instead, the Court concluded, “‘Tangible object’ . . . is better
read to cover only objects one can use to record or preserve information, not
all objects in the physical world.”114 In Yates, the Court applied noscitur a
sociis115 to narrow the meaning of “tangible object” in the context of the
surrounding terms, which all related to documents and records.116
In the Certification Statute, “judge” is surrounded by “law enforcement
official,” “prosecutor,” and “other . . . authority investigating criminal
activity.”117 Here, noscitur a sociis could be applied to narrow “judge” to
include only a criminal judge as the surrounding language implies a criminal
nature. However, noscitur a sociis “is not dispositive if other statutory
context suggests a broader reading.”118
Courts utilize other textual aids to determine textual meaning. In Yates,
Justice Ginsburg discussed another supportive, but not dispositive, textual
aid: titles.119 The title of a statute or section can provide context to help
resolve ambiguity in statutory interpretation.120 In Yates, the statute in
question included statute and section titles that supported a narrow
construction of “tangible object.”121 Here, the statute and section titles
surrounding the Certification Statute are almost uniformly survivor focused:
“Establishment of Humanitarian/Material Witness Non-Immigrant
Classification,”122 “Protection for Certain Crime Victims Including Victims
of Crimes Against Women,”123 “Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act
109. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
111. Cf. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979) (“Well the problem is that your
mommy and I both want you to live with us, see, so that’s why we decided to go see this man,
who I told you is the judge, and we let him decide because he’s very wise and experienced
about these things.”); WHAT MAISIE KNEW (Red Crown Productions 2012) (“Your mother
would have a fit, but I don’t think I’d have a problem squaring it with the judge.”).
112. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
113. See id. at 1081–89.
114. Id. at 1081.
115. See id. at 1085 (“[T]he principle . . . [that] a word is known by the company it keeps.”).
116. Id. at 1085–86.
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012).
118. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 408.
119. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–84.
120. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 412; ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 675–
76; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 108, at 221–24.
121. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–84.
122. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1513(b), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012)).
123. Id. § 1513, 114 Stat. at 1533.
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of 2000,”124 “Violence Against Women Act of 2000,”125 and the “Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.”126 This suggests that a
statutory reading should also be survivor focused and that the appropriate
reading of the Certification Statute should be broad, to protect as many
survivors as possible. To limit “judges” strictly to criminal judges would
exclude all IPV survivors where prosecutors have declined to prosecute and
law enforcement officials have declined to investigate.127 It would also deny
relief to IPV survivors who do not choose to seek criminal assistance, either
out of fear of their abuser or deportation.
Purpose clauses can also aid textual construction.128 The purpose clause
of the U Visa provision of the BIWPA states that the law is designed to
“offer[] protection to victims . . . in keeping with the humanitarian interests
of the United States.”129 The purpose clause further explains, without
qualification, that “[p]roviding temporary legal status to aliens who have
been severely victimized by criminal activity also comports with the
humanitarian interests of the United States.”130 But this clause also expounds
another purpose: to “strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to
detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence”131 with the
goal of “facilitat[ing] the reporting of crimes to law enforcement officials by
. . . abused aliens who are not in lawful immigration status.”132 The purpose
clause of the entire BIWPA reflects this dual purpose, as well.133 The first
stated purpose of the BIWPA is to “remove barriers to criminal prosecutions
of” abusers,134 while the second stated purpose is “to offer protection” to
survivors.135
The BIWPA states the congressional findings upon which it is premised in
its introductory clause: “[P]roviding battered immigrant women and children
who were experiencing domestic violence at home with protection against
deportation allows them to obtain protection orders against their abusers and
frees them to cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors in criminal
cases.”136 These introductory clauses indicate that a balance must be struck
between the government’s interests in protecting survivors and prosecuting
abusers. This suggests that “State . . . judge” could mean both the criminal

124. Id. § 1501, 114 Stat. at 1518.
125. Id. § 1001, 114 Stat. at 1491.
126. Id. § 1, 114 Stat. at 1464.
127. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
128. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 412 (“Statutory provisions setting forth Congress’s
purposes should be given great weight in understanding the legislative purpose(s).”); SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 108, at 217–20 (“A . . . purpose clause . . . is a permissible indicator of
meaning.”).
129. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at
1533–34.
130. See id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534.
131. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 1533–34.
132. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534.
133. See id. § 1502(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1518.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 1502(b)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518.
136. Id. § 1502(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518 (emphasis added).
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judge that oversees prosecution of an abuser and the family court judge that
oversees the civil proceeding allowing an IPV survivor to protect herself.
Judge Frank Easterbrook explains that regulations can also be a useful
textual aid to statutory interpretation: “Let us not pretend that texts answer
every question . . . . [T]he interpreter should go to some other source of rules,
including administrative agencies . . . .”137 This echoes the suggestion by
Professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks that agencies have useful
technical expertise and more time to sensibly interpret statutory language.138
The U Visa Regulation enumerates a list of certifying agencies, including
“agencies that have criminal investigative jurisdiction in their respective
areas of expertise, including, but not limited to, child protective services, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Department of
Labor.”139 The Resource Guide defines certifying agencies as “Federal,
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial government agencies that have criminal,
civil, or administrative investigative or prosecutorial authority.”140 This
shows that USCIS understands the language in the Certification Statute to
include civil agencies like the EEOC—one that is, by design, essentially
powerless.141 It must, therefore, understand the language to include a state
judge with the power to make substantive rules of law.
Ultimately, the text of the Certification Statute, interpreted with the
assistance of textual aids like dictionaries, language canons, and agency
interpretation, authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications.
2. Family Court Judges as Investigators of Criminal Activity
Another key issue in interpreting the Certification Statute is whether, to
make the certification, the certifying agency must be the entity investigating
or prosecuting criminal activity. The Certification Statute requires that the
law enforcement certification state that the U Visa petitioner “has been
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation of
criminal activity.142
The statute presents two different answers. First, a linguistic canon, the
last antecedent rule, suggests that the signatory of the certification is not
required to be the authority investigating criminal activity. The last
antecedent rule dictates that “qualifying words or phrases refer only to the
last antecedent, unless contrary to the apparent legislative intent derived from
the sense of the entire enactment.”143 The Certification Statute defines those
137. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1993).
138. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1290 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018).
140. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 6.
141. See Chuck Henson, In Defense of McDonnell Douglas: The Domination of Title VII
by the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 551, 564–66 (2015).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2012).
143. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 670–71; see, e.g., Lockhart v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016) (holding that, in a statute listing “aggravated sexual abuse,
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who can make a certification as follows: “[A] Federal, State, or local law
enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local
authority investigating criminal activity.”144 Here, the qualifying words are
“investigating criminal activity,” and the last antecedent is “other Federal,
State, or local authority.” Applying the last antecedent rule, “investigating
criminal activity” relates only to the last antecedent, not to the preceding
certifying officials. This means that the signatory does not need to be
investigating criminal activity unless “structural or contextual evidence . . .
‘rebut[s] the last antecedent inference.’”145
Second, and conversely, using agency guidance as a textual aid, as Judge
Easterbrook proposed,146 the U Visa Regulation rebuts the last antecedent
inference. The U Visa Regulation states that a certifying judge must have
“responsibility for the investigation . . . of a qualifying crime or criminal
activity.”147 Thus, if any judge issuing a U Visa certification is required to
conduct an “investigation” of criminal activity, what constitutes an
“investigation” must be understood. This Part asks whether a family court
does investigate criminal activity by exploring what constitutes an
investigation.
An ordinary understanding of investigation is not restricted to the work of
a criminal court—the word has wide and general applications beyond
criminal law. Documentary filmmakers investigate their subjects,148
scientists investigate the natural world,149 artists undertake artistic
investigation,150 and there are investigative journalists,151 insurance

sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward,” “involving a minor or
ward” applies only to “abusive sexual conduct,” not “aggravated sexual abuse” and “sexual
abuse”).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1).
145. See Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 965 (quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543
U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005)).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018). The insertion of the comma after “other authority”
indicates USCIS’s intention to rebut the last antecedent rule. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra
note 104, at 671.
148. See, e.g., Jordan Raup, Errol Morris on Investigation, The B-Side, and
Unpredictability, FILM SOC’Y LINCOLN CTR. (July 10, 2017), https://www.filmlinc.org/daily/
errol-morris-on-investigation-the-b-side-and-unpredictability [https://perma.cc/3E2E-8JZY]
(quoting the documentary filmmaker Errol Morris as saying, “I think I’m an investigator at
heart”).
149. E.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 505 (16th ed. 1992) (quoting biologist
Thomas Henry Huxley as saying, “The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the
expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind”).
150. E.g., Holland Cotter, Ellsworth Kelly, Who Shaped Geometries on a Bold Scale, Dies
at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/arts/ellsworth-kellyartist-who-mixed-european-abstraction-into-everyday-life-dies-at-92.html [https://perma.cc/
YUK5-6WEG] (quoting the late abstract artist Ellsworth Kelly as saying, “To me the
investigation of perception was of the greatest interest”).
151. E.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Brothers 1976) (“Well, if you’re conducting
that kind of investigation, certainly it comes as no surprise to you to know that Howard was
with the CIA.”).
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investigators,152 and private investigators.153 The Google search method,
utilized by Judge Richard Posner in United States v. Costello,154 which is
meant to offer contextual clues to understanding terms,155 reveals more
examples of criminal investigation than not (“bureau of investigation,”
“crime investigation,” “criminal investigation,” “fbi investigation,” “crime
scene investigation”),156 but the results are also driven by recent, high-profile
criminal investigations.157
Other textual aids echo this broad reading. The Supreme Court uses two
other methods to understand ordinary meaning: looking to usages of words
by the press158 and in popular culture.159 A search of “investigation” in the
New York Times database from the year of the BIWPA’s enactment echoes a

152. Cf. DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944) (“A claims man is a doctor and a
bloodhound and a cop and a judge and a jury and a father confessor all in one.”).
153. E.g., Veronica Mars: Pilot (UPN television broadcast Sept. 22, 2004) (“My afterschool job means tailing philandering spouses or investigating false injury claims.”).
154. 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
155. See id. at 1044–45 (googling phrases like “harboring fugitives” and “harboring guests”
to interpret “to harbor”).
156. Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=
all&geo=US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/7PFL-8RZB] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018)
(“Related queries” box, sorted by “Top,” listing results from 2004 to present).
157. The results include “trump investigation,” “hillary investigation,” “mueller
investigation,” and “russia investigation” as of March 13, 2018. See Investigation, supra note
156 (“Related queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing results from 2004 to present). This is
echoed in results from previous years. See, e.g., Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS,
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2006-01-01%202006-12-31&geo=
US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/FAR9-8WQ5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Related
queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing results from 2006, including “duke lacrosse
investigation”); Investigation, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/
explore?date=2015-01-01%202015-12-31&geo=US&q=investigation [https://perma.cc/HR
29-EFMT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Related queries” box, sorted by “Rising,” listing top
result for 2015, including “patrick kane investigation”).
158. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1998) (interpreting “to
carry” by using citations to the New York Times, Boston Globe, Colorado Springs Gazette
Telegraph, Arkansas Gazette, and San Diego Union-Tribune). The Court’s interpretation in
Muscarello was subsequently overruled by an act of Congress. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra
note 104, at 707.
159. Compare Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129 (citing Robinson Crusoe and Moby Dick), with
id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing The Magnificent Seven and M*A*S*H).
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primarily,160 but not exclusively, criminal connotation.161 Examples from
popular culture can be found in criminal162 and noncriminal contexts.163
Dictionaries164 support this inclusive reading. General dictionaries
uniformly define investigation as a detailed and systematic inquiry.165 Legal
dictionaries speak more particularly about official and procedural elements,
sometimes criminal166 and sometimes administrative.167
These dictionary definitions are reflected in agency regulations. The
U Visa Regulation writes a new word into the Certification Statute:
“detection.”168 As a textual aid to investigation, this addition shows that

160. See, e.g., David Johnston, The 2000 Campaign: The Investigation; an Old Issue
Returns to Haunt Reno Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/06/26/us/the-2000-campaign-the-investigation-an-old-issue-returns-to-haunt-renoagain.html [https://perma.cc/V39S-YKAA] (discussing the criminal investigation into Al
Gore’s 1996 campaign fundraising); Tina Kelley, Stolen Trailer Found in Queens, but Cargo
of Cyanide Is Missing, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/05/13/nyregion/stolen-trailer-found-in-queens-but-cargo-of-cyanide-is-missing.html
[http://perma.cc/6WPZ-8A7V] (discussing an FBI investigation into stolen toxins).
161. See, e.g., James P. Harley, Letter to the Editor, Anthrax Hunting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/16/books/l-anthrax-hunting-247588.html
[https://perma.cc/E5LS-2ZLW] (discussing a book about a 1979 scientific investigation into
an anthrax outbreak); Stephanie Strom, N.T.T. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/business/world-business-briefing-asia-nttinvestigation.html [https://perma.cc/EF5F-6NMA] (reporting on a Japanese agency
investigation into a possible telecommunications monopoly).
162. E.g., Law & Order: Aftershock (NBC television broadcast May 22, 1996) (“In the
criminal justice system, the people are represented by two separate yet equally important
groups: the police who investigate crime and the district attorneys who prosecute the
offenders. These are their stories.”).
163. E.g., Star Trek: The Galileo Seven (NBC television broadcast Jan. 5, 1967)
(“Captain’s log, star date 2821.5. . . . Our course leads us past Murasaki 312, a quasar-like
formation. Vague, undefined. Priceless opportunity for scientific investigation.”).
164. There has been a recent surge in dictionary use in Supreme Court opinions. See
generally James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013).
Legal scholars examining this phenomenon attribute this rise, at least partially, to the Court
attempting to rebut accusations of judicial activism by focusing on these neutral-appearing
sources. See id. at 490–92. This Note will use the dictionaries favored by the Supreme Court,
both general and legal. See id. at 529–31. And to understand the meaning of “investigation”
at the time of passage of the BIWPA, this Note only uses dictionary editions in circulation at
the time of the passage of the BIWPA. See id. at 511–12.
165. See Investigation, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1996) (“detailed inquiry
or systematic examination”); Investigation, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1997) (“a searching inquiry for ascertaining facts”); Investigation,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“the making of a search or inquiry; systematic
examination; careful and minute research”); Investigation, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957) (“thorough inquiry”); Investigation, WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986) (“detailed examination” and
“searching inquiry”).
166. See Investigate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
167. See Investigation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“[a]n administrative
function”).
168. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5) (2018) (defining “investigation or prosecution” as “the
detection or investigation of a qualifying crime or criminal activity, as well as to the
prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or criminal
activity” (emphasis added)).
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USCIS understands “investigation” to require something more than simply
identifying criminal activity—something like a systematic inquiry.
Guided by these insights, a family court certainly investigates during
adjudication. For example, a family court engages in a systematic inquiry of
finances in domestic support cases169 and of parental fitness in custody and
visitation cases.170 And a family court investigates criminal activity in some
specific proceedings, like petitions for orders of protection and violations of
granted orders of protection, divorce applications, and, often, custody and
visitation cases.171 By a textual analysis alone, a family court does
investigate criminal activity172 and is authorized to certify U Visa
applications by its litigants.
This Part discussed two questions: (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes
state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must
be investigating criminal activity in order to certify. To answer the first
question, this Part applied noscitur a sociis and examined relevant section
and statutory titles, purpose clauses, and agency guidance to determine that
state judge does include state family court judges.173 To answer the second
question, this Part applied the last antecedent rule and agency guidance as a
textual aid to find ambiguity in the text. According to the last antecedent
rule, a family court judge does not need to be investigating criminal activity
in order to certify a U Visa application, while agency guidance suggests the
opposite interpretation.174 Further textual analysis indicates that the
Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications
in either case. Ordinary meaning, dictionaries, press usage, and the Googlesearch method define “investigation” broadly as a systematic inquiry,175
which a family court clearly engages in.176 Taken together, a textual analysis
indicates that the Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify
U Visa applications.

169. E.g., McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (remanding a
child-support case to the trial court for “further investigation” into a parent’s finances).
170. E.g., Ching v. Ching, No. 23952, 2003 Haw. App. LEXIS 187, at *4 (Ct. App. June
16, 2003) (discussing the need for “an investigation of the current custody and visitation
arrangements”); State ex rel. Reitz v. Ringer, 510 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Neb. 1994) (explaining
that the trial court acquired temporary custody of the subject child to “further investigate the
issue of permanent custody”).
171. See, e.g., W. VA. RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE FOR FAM. CT. 48a(b) (prescribing
that “the circuit court may utilize the investigative and mandamus process” in child abuse and
neglect proceedings).
172. But see Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (ruling that, for the purposes
of one of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[a] judge in a civil trial is
not an investigator, rather a judge”). The Nipper holding, however, is not based on textual
arguments. See id.
173. See supra Part II.A.1.
174. See supra Part II.A.2.
175. See supra Part II.A.2.i.
176. See supra Part II.A.2.i.
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B. A Legal Process Analysis of the BIWPA
This Part engages with two key methods of legal process theory to address
the question of whether family courts are authorized under the Certification
Statute to certify U Visa applications. “The legal process methodology was
the dominant mode for thinking about statutes for a generation and, in fact,
remains highly relevant to issues of statutory interpretation.”177 Two leading
legal process scholars, Professors Hart and Sacks, hypothesized that “[t]he
meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible
purpose” and wrote that “[t]he first task in the interpretation of any statute
. . . is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it.”178 And as a
way of discerning this purpose, courts looked to a statute’s legislative
history.179 New textualists have heavily criticized this method as imprecise,
“unnecessary[,] or even inadmissible.”180 But even new textualists have
found it necessary to apply this kind of analysis in certain areas.181
Proponents of the legal process school of statutory interpretation maintain
that it is the duty of courts, as faithful agents of the legislature,182 to follow
legislative history because, while imperfect, it is the clearest indication of the
will of Congress.183 Courts are especially inclined to apply a legal process
analysis to the Immigration and Nationality Act.184

177. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 506.
178. See HART & SACKS, supra note 138, at 1124–25 (emphasis omitted).
179. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 198–99.
180. Id. at 201; see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 62 (“Am I not a notorious
opponent of legislative history? That is indeed my position, and it grows out of a belief that
becoming accustomed to mining the debates for clues creates some profound and unwelcome
changes in how judges see laws.”).
181. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1686–92 (2004) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s
strong purposivist approach to state sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
182. See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L.
REV. 595, 604 (1997) (“[I]n matters of statutory interpretation, the judiciary must bend to the
legislative command. That is the oath and obligation of every judge.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 343 (1986) (“[O]fficial statements of
purpose, . . . established by the practice of legislative history, should be treated as themselves
acts of the state personified.”); ESKRIDGE JR., supra note, 105 at 209 (“Reliable legislative
materials ought to be a rich source of guidance when interpreters figure out the ordinary
meaning of statutory language, read in light of the statutory purpose, both understood through
the eyes of the legislators responsible for the statute.”); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries,
Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77
(1994) (“Legislative history . . . can supply information about how the statute is expected to
operate, what subjects it addresses, what problems it seeks to solve, what objectives it tries to
accomplish, and what means it employs to reach those objectives . . . .”).
184. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit considered the applications by three paroled noncitizens for
permanent residency status. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir.
1973). In evaluating whether the three applicants had met the statutory requirement of being
“physically present” in the United States for seven years, the court rejected the literal meaning
of “physically present” because “we are in the never-never land of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, where plain words do not always mean what they say.” See id.; cf. MARY
MARTIN & KATHY NOLAN, Never Never Land, on PETER PAN ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST
(RCA Victor 1954) (“I have a place where dreams are born and time is never planned, it’s not
on any chart, you must find it with your heart: never never land.”). The Ninth Circuit instead
looked to other factors, including legislative history. See Yuen Sang Low, 479 F.2d at 822–23.
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This Part takes two legal process approaches to analyzing the BIWPA.
Part II.B.1 examines the legislative history of the statute using a variety of
legislative materials. Part II.B.2 seeks to understand the general purpose of
the statute using statutory history.
1. Legislative History of the BIWPA
The Supreme Court has considered a wide variety of legislative
materials—ranging from an unsigned, handwritten “slip of paper”185 to
district court case citations in a committee report186—as representative of a
statute’s legislative history. However, scholars describe a hierarchy of
materials. Conference reports and committee reports are given the most
weight, followed by the statements of supporters, congressional silence, and
subsequent statutory history.187 Executive statements, like presidential
signing or veto statements, are given the least weight.188 This Part provides
a brief overview of the legislative history of the BIWPA and then examines
each of these materials in depth.
The initial version of the BIWPA, the Battered Immigrant Women
Protection Act of 1999 (“BIWPA 1999”), contained the first iteration of the
U Visa.189 BIWPA 1999 proposed to grant two thousand U Visas annually
to noncitizens who had suffered significant abuse, possessed “material
information concerning criminal or other unlawful activity,” and were willing
to share, or have shared, that information with a law enforcement or
administrative agency.190
There was a hearing on BIWPA 1999 in July 2000.191 A few months later,
bill sponsors Representatives Sheila Jackson Lee and Jan Schakowsky
successfully moved to include BIWPA 1999 in the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA),192 a bill aimed at combating
human trafficking, especially sex trafficking.193 In conference, a bipartisan
group of senators incorporated the reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act into VTVPA, as well.194 The conference report on VTVPA

185. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
FEDERAL SYSTEM 588 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the importance of such a document,
thought to be drafted by Senator Ellsworth during the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in
the Court’s decision in Erie).
186. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation
of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully
to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.”).
187. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 240; ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 36 (1997).
188. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 254–56.
189. See H.R. 3083, 106th Cong. § 13(b) (1999).
190. Id. § 13(b)–(c).
191. See generally BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1.
192. See 146 CONG. REC. H7630–31 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2000).
193. See H.R. 3244, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
194. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,182 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[I]n
light of the unwillingness of the Senate Republican leadership to allow the Senate to act on
THE
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included the reauthorization of VAWA (“VAWA 2000”), which included the
BIWPA.195 This report contained a revised version of the U Visa.
BIWPA 1999 proposed only an optional law enforcement certification.196
And BIWPA 1999 expressly proposed that this optional certification could
be made by a civil court or agency.197 However, the revised U Visa
provisions in VTVPA mandate, not suggest, a law enforcement certification,
and its text does not expressly include civil court action or investigation.198
VTVPA, which included this version of the U Visa, was enacted in October
2000.199
a. Conference and Committee Reports
The BIWPA conference report supports broad U Visa certification. In
analyzing legislative history, conference and committee reports are given
special weight.200 The discussion of the U Visa in these reports is minimal,
but the conference report of VTVPA explains that the BIWPA “makes some
targeted improvements that our experience with the original [VAWA] has
shown to be necessary,” such as “[s]trengthening and refining the protections
for battered immigrant women.”201 In its section-by-section analysis, the
report described the U Visa as being “for victims of certain serious crimes
that tend to target vulnerable foreign individuals without immigration
status.”202 It also described the certification requirement: “a judge certifies
that the victim has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in
investigating or prosecuting the crime.”203

[VAWA 2000] and the lapse of its authorization, I joined with Senator Biden and Senator
Hatch to add it to the sex trafficking conference report we now consider.”).
195. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 103, 115 (2000) (Conf. Rep.); 146 CONG. REC. H9034
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (“Mr. Speaker, I do want to thank the
conference committee for putting in the elements dealing with battered immigrant
women . . . .”).
196. H.R. 3083, 106th Cong. § 13(b)(3) (1999) (requiring only “credible evidence,” which
“may include certification from . . . law enforcement” (emphasis added)).
197. See id. (providing that certification could come “from a Federal or State law
enforcement officer or prosecutor or a Federal or State official responsible for bringing
enforcement actions that the alien is willing to cooperate or has cooperated in a criminal or
civil court action or investigation or Federal or State administrative agency enforcement action
or investigation”).
198. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
199. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Press Release,
Representative Schakowsky, Schakowsky Provisions to Protect Battered Immigrant Women
and to Expand Transitional Housing for Domestic Abuse Victims Passed House, Included in
Bill to Reauthorize VAWA and to Combat Trafficking of Women and Children into Sex Trade
(Oct. 6, 2000), https://schakowsky.house.gov/press-releases/schakowsky-provisions-toprotect-battered-immigrant-women-and-to-expand-transitional-housing-for-domestic-abusevictims-passed-house-included-in-bill-to-reauthorize-vawa-and-to-combat-trafficking-ofwomen-and-children-into-sex-traden [https://perma.cc/6UPG-8LNN].
200. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 240–45.
201. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 103 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
202. Id. at 115.
203. Id.
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It is important that the U Visa is described only in terms of helping
survivors and that the certification requirement is not described as a tool to
reduce immigration fraud.204 This indicates that the congressional purpose
was to help as many survivors as possible. And this purpose would be best
served by allowing as many agencies as possible to certify U Visa
applications, including family courts.
b. Supporters’ Statements
The statements of a bill’s supporters, especially its sponsors, are given
some weight in a legal process analysis of specific legislative intent.205 The
statements of supporters about the U Visa in the House and Senate during the
legislative process were rich and evocative but not necessarily indicative of
the intent of Congress as a whole.206
The U Visa had a winding road to enactment. Initially included in the
BIWPA proposed in 1999, the provisions were altered and included in
VAWA 2000 which was, in conference, incorporated into VTVPA.207
Supporters and sponsors spoke at length throughout this process, and their
statements illuminate the original intent of the U Visa and the meaning of the
legislative changes.
The BIWPA was initially proposed in the House of Representatives by
Representative Schakowsky.208 Schakowsky proposed the bill in October
She spoke
1999, during Domestic Violence Awareness Month.209
sympathetically about the wide-ranging effects of intimate partner violence,
especially on undocumented immigrants.210 She explained that the BIWPA
“would expand legal protections for battered immigrant women so that they
may flee violent homes, obtain court protections, and cooperate in the
criminal prosecution of their abusers without fear of deportation.”211
At the July hearing, another bill sponsor, Representative Sheila Jackson
Lee (D-Tex.), told stories of undocumented IPV survivors failed by existing
immigration legislation.212 In her prepared statement, she explained that
“immigrant women are caught in an intersection of immigration, family and
welfare laws that do[] not positively reflect on their needs and life
204. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
205. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 245–48. These statements have fallen out of favor
in recent Supreme Court terms. Id. at 247.
206. DWORKIN, supra note 183, at 343 (“It would be absurd, of course, to count every
statement any legislator makes about the purpose of a statute as itself the act of the state.”);
see, e.g., Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 956 n.8 (9th Cir.
1981) (“[T]he remarks of but one senator made subsequent to the passage of the bill . . . do
not provide a reliable indication of the understanding of the Senate as a whole.”).
207. See generally infra notes 208–23 and accompanying text.
208. 145 CONG. REC. 26,577–78 (1999); About Jan, CONGRESSWOMAN JAN SCHAKOWSKY,
https://schakowsky.house.gov/about-jan1/ [https://perma.cc/6FTF-NZCT] (last visited Apr.
13, 2018).
209. See 145 CONG. REC. 26,577 (1999).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 27–30; see, e.g., supra notes 1–4 and
accompanying text.
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experiences, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation with few options to
redress their situations.”213 Likely in an effort to win over her more
conservative colleagues, Representative Schakowsky testified at the hearing:
“Let me begin by emphasizing what my bill will NOT do: It will NOT open
the floodgates to undocumented or unwanted immigrants.”214
The bill’s U Visa provisions were watered down in conference.215
However, its Senate supporters echoed this same intent. Senator Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass.), who championed the immigration measures in the
Senate,216 took a similarly balanced tone. Senator Kennedy described the
need for undocumented IPV survivors “to seek protective orders and
cooperate with law enforcement officials to prosecute crimes of domestic
violence.”217 Still, he described the bill’s purpose as being to “make it easier
for these immigrants and their children to escape abusive relationships and
obtain the help they deserve.”218 Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), another
sponsor, explained, “We also, for the first time, look at battered
immigrants . . . . They need to understand their rights, that their bodies don’t
belong to anyone else, and they have a right to cry out if they are abused.”219
However, other supporters spoke about how the bill would help to facilitate
much-needed prosecution of abusers. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) spoke
about his time as a prosecutor and explained, “One of the things I learned in
my years as a prosecutor is that too often nobody wanted to pursue [IPV]
cases. . . . This act, itself, will help focus the attention of law enforcement
on this.”220 And Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) spoke to the importance
of the multiple facets of the bill: “The [domestic violence] hotline is
important; the training for police is important; the support for law
enforcement is important; the support for battered women shelters is so
important . . . . All of this matters.”221
The original House sponsors were more measured in their praise of the
final bill. Representative Jackson Lee explained that the bill’s intent—to
protect the uniquely vulnerable undocumented IPV survivors—was
unchanged, but she lamented what was lost.222 In particular, she lamented
the exclusion of BIWPA 1999’s proposal to expand existing law to allow

213. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 30.
214. Id. at 33.
215. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
216. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,169 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone)
(“I am sitting next to Senator Kennedy who has done so much with the immigration work.”).
217. Id. at S10,170.
218. Id.
219. Id. at S10,173.
220. Id. at S10,176–77.
221. Id. at S10,180.
222. Compare 146 CONG. REC. H9034 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson
Lee) (“The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999, would provide much needed
access to battered immigrant victims of domestic violence.”), with id. at H9041 (“I am very
disappointed that some missing provisions that were in [the BIWPA] are not in the Conference
Report.”).
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undocumented immigrants to access public assistance.223 While neither she
nor Representative Schakowsky spoke directly about the U Visa provisions,
Representative Jackson Lee’s lukewarm statements indicate that something
was lost from the original bill.224
Ultimately, these statements indicate that the certification requirement
should not be interpreted without caution. The initially optional, very broad
certification requirement was transformed into a mandatory, narrower
requirement, which disappointed the BIWPA’s sponsors.225 However, the
bill’s liberal supporters in the Senate were laudatory and enthusiastic,
indicating that the U Visa was still intended to aid survivors. In Part IV, this
Note proposes guidelines in keeping with this balance.
c. Debate
This balance is echoed in the congressional debates between supporters
and detractors. Congressional debates between supporters and detractors
carry limited weight in analysis, partly because legislators interject
hyperbolic statements to persuade their colleagues.226 Nevertheless, these
debates can help illuminate the issues.227 Here, the discussions at the July
hearing are instructive as they show the two battling impulses of the House:
to protect undocumented IPV survivors on the one hand, and to encourage
cooperation with law enforcement on the other.
In his opening statement at the hearing, Representative Lamar S. Smith (RTex.), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
iterated his concerns about the bill.228 He criticized the initial U Visa
provisions and pointed out that “many of the benefits created in this bill do
not require battered aliens to cooperate with law enforcement officers to
enable them to investigate or prosecute the aliens’ abusers.”229 He later
posed a question to Leslye Orloff, director of the Immigrant Women Program
at the NOW Legal Defense Fund,230 who testified earlier in the hearing: “Do
you not think the bill could be improved if we required cooperation with law
enforcement officials to go after the abusers?”231 Ms. Orloff advised against
such a requirement,232 but Representative Smith was unconvinced and stated,
“I have a major disagreement with the bill if it is not going to require
223. See id. at H9041 (“I . . . deeply regret that there are no provisions in the report that
provide access to food stamps to battered aliens; and access to housing, and access to benefits
that would enable the alien to avoid battery or extreme cruelty in the future.”).
224. Cf. supra notes 222–23.
225. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
226. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 187, at 36–37. Professors Mikva and Lane also
distinguish between different types of debate and give hearing and committee debate more
weight than “hot” floor debate. See id.
227. See id.
228. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 24.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Id. at 57.
231. Id. at 73.
232. See id. at 73–74 (“I don’t think it would be wise to have any piece of legislation that
requires such cooperation, and, in fact, original VAWA did not for that reason.”).
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cooperation with law enforcement officials to try to stop the abuse from
occurring.”233
This colloquy indicates why the U Visa provisions changed from the
suggestion in BIWPA 1999 to the requirement in VTVPA—concern that the
original U Visa would not do enough to protect the public safety. This
concern is addressed by allowing U Visa applicants to seek certification from
an agency that has played some role in helping to “stop the abuse from
occurring.” Family courts help to do this in a variety of proceedings.234
d. Executive Statements
Executive statements, usually presidential signing statements or veto
statements, are given limited weight in statutory interpretation.235 President
Clinton made three statements on VTVPA: one on the passage of the bill in
the House,236 one on the passage of the bill in Congress,237 and a signing
statement.238 All three statements are laudatory,239 but the only one to
address the immigration provisions is the signing statement. In the signing
statement, President Clinton said, “Of great importance, [VTVPA] restores
and expands VAWA’s protections for battered immigrants by helping them
escape abuse and by holding batterers accountable.”240 He went on to
describe the U Visa provision in the same terms as the congressional debate,
as a balance between “greater protection to victims” and “strengthening the
ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases
of domestic violence.”241
*

*

*

Ultimately, the Congress that enacted the BIWPA clearly intended to
compromise between the goals of protecting undocumented IPV survivors
and punishing abusers.242 As evidenced by the most authoritative sources of
legislative history, Congress intended to expand immigration relief for
undocumented IPV survivors to protect otherwise incredibly vulnerable
people,243 but it was clearly concerned that permissive U Visa requirements
233. See id. at 74.
234. See infra Part IV.
235. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 255–56; see, e.g., Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute
in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 113–15,
118–19 (1999) (describing the New York Court of Appeals’ reliance on executive statements,
like a letter from New York City Mayor Lindsay in one case, as “problematic”).
236. Statement on House of Representatives Action on Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Legislation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2063 (Oct. 6, 2000).
237. Statement on Congressional Action on Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Legislation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2137 (Oct. 11, 2000).
238. Statement on Signing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
3 PUB. PAPERS 2352–55 (Oct. 28, 2000).
239. See generally supra notes 236–38.
240. Statement on Signing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
3 PUB. PAPERS 2353 (Oct. 28, 2000).
241. See id.
242. See supra Parts II.B.1.b–d.
243. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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would “open the floodgates to unwanted immigrants.”244 Compromise and
balance are reflected in the bulk of the U Visa’s legislative history.245 Any
interpretation of the Certification Statute should reflect this compromise.
IPV survivors frequently seek refuge in family court,246 and Congress,
which heard from immigration experts and IPV advocates during the
BIWPA’s hearings,247 knew this. Through the lens of legislative history,
family court judges were plausibly authorized by Congress to certify U Visa
applications, subject to certain limits. The statements of the bills’ original
sponsors especially reflect that the Certification Statute was intended to be
narrower than they initially envisioned and that agencies should not freely
certify U Visas. The text provides one such limit—that the certifying agency
must be the one investigating criminal activity. This intent plausibly rebuts
the last antecedent inference and is in keeping with USCIS’s interpretation,
expressed through the U Visa Regulation.248
2. Statutory History of the BIWPA
One of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule.249
This rule was described in Heydon’s Case,250 a 1584 case in the English
Court of Exchequer.251 The dispute centered around the definition of “estate”
in an English statute.252 In seeking to resolve this question, Lord Coke
designed a sequence of questions to determine the statute’s meaning, which
were targeted to identify the “mischief and defect” in the common law that
the statute was designed to remedy and then to construct the statutory
meaning in order to give weight to that remedy.253 This method is still used
by modern scholars: Professors Hart and Sacks advised that “[t]he court
should then proceed to do, in substance, just what Lord Coke said it should
do in Heydon’s Case.”254 This Part applies this same method to identify the
“mischief and defect” that the BIWPA was designed to remedy using
statutory history. Statutory history is used frequently by courts with minimal
controversy.255
Crime became a dominant public issue in the 1960s,256 spurred by a sudden
and intense rise in violence and increasing anxiety about racial and social

244. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
245. See supra Parts II.B.1.c–d.
246. See supra Parts I.B–C.
247. See generally BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1.
248. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018).
249. See Peter D. Webster et al., Statutory Construction in Florida: In Search of a
Principled Approach, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 435, 443 (2008).
250. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7a.
251. Id. at 637; 3 Co. Rep. at 7a.
252. See id. at 638; 3 Co. Rep. at 7b.
253. Id.
254. HART & SACKS, supra note 138, at 1378.
255. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 204–06; see, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 43–49, 53–56 (2004); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 670–77 (1979).
256. JENNIFER L. DURHAM, CRIME IN AMERICA 1, 4 (1996).
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change in America.257 It became a dominant political issue in 1964 when
Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate, campaigned on a
platform of “enforcing law and order.”258 While Goldwater’s candidacy
failed dramatically, crime was placed on the national stage and did not leave
for over two decades.259
The Republican presidencies of those two decades emphasized the
punishment of criminals, beginning with President Nixon stoking fears about
civil rights protesters and anti-Vietnam protestors.260 This continued into the
1980s, when President Reagan implemented partisan anticrime policy, which
emphasized harsh sentencing and erosion of the criminal justice reforms
presided over by the Warren Court in the 1960s.261
In 1992, Bill Clinton, then a young Democrat from Arkansas, ran a more
conservative kind of campaign than his Democratic predecessors. In its
endorsement of his candidacy, the New York Times wrote:
Mr. Clinton has taken strong and consistent positions, often notably more
moderate than those of traditional liberal Democrats. For instance, he says
to deadbeat fathers who fail to pay child support: “Take responsibility for
your children, or we will force you to do so.” Note the words responsibility
and force.262

President Clinton’s election was described by a critic as emblematic of “an
elite-led, extralegal, and often violent intolerance for the disorder inherent in
active citizen agency and a democratic public sphere,”263 while his supporters
described him as “devot[ed] to social justice.”264
As President, one of the largest reforms Clinton oversaw was the passage
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the “Crime
Bill”).265 The Crime Bill was a massive anticrime initiative passed after a
long, nasty legislative battle.266 It increased funding for police, following
Clinton’s campaign promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets;
increased funding to build new prisons; instituted the “three-strikes rule” and
an assault weapons ban; and earmarked billions for crime-prevention
programs.267 One of those spending programs was the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994.268 VAWA 1994 authorized $1.6 billion for programs
257. See id. at 4. See generally Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, America Doesn’t Stop at the
Rio Grande: Democracy and the War on Crime, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME 37 (Mary
Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008).
258. TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS 5 (2001).
259. See id.
260. DURHAM, supra note 256, at 5.
261. GEST, supra note 258, at 42–62.
262. See Endorsement, George Bush’s Failure, Bill Clinton’s Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1992, at E14.
263. William Lyons, Frightening Citizens and a Pedagogy of Violence, in AFTER THE WAR
ON CRIME, supra note 257, at 123, 128.
264. Endorsement, supra note 262.
265. See GEST, supra note 258, at 243.
266. See id. at 219–43.
267. See id. at 196–97, 242–44.
268. See Joe Biden, Opinion, 20 Years of Change: Joe Biden on the Violence Against
Women Act, TIME (Sept. 10, 2014), http://time.com/3319325/joe-biden-violence-against-
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seeking to end gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence.269
Recognizing that immigrant IPV survivors are subjected to a particular kind
of immigration abuse, VAWA 1994 created a pathway for abused noncitizens
married to citizens or lawful permanent residents to handle their own
petitions for status.270
BIWPA 1999 was proposed when Congress was returning to VAWA 1994
to reauthorize the spending programs, and was eventually included in VAWA
2000.271 In terms of statutory history, the mischief that VAWA 1994 was
intended to cure was clearly crime. The chosen remedy was established by
decades of legislation that put more police on the streets, enforced longer
sentences for criminals, and built more prisons to house them.272 Congress
was driven by “the three ‘P’s’ of police officers, prisons, and prevention.”273
This purpose would telegraph a clear, narrow reading of the Certification
Statute: If police, prosecutors, and sentencing authorities have always been
the chosen statutory remedies, then criminal courts alone should be allowed
to certify U Visas.
However, this conclusion is complicated by the discussions surrounding
VAWA 2000, which was included in VTVPA. In the debates on VTVPA,
legislators spoke of a different “three Ps”: prevention, protection, and
prosecution.274 When BIWPA 1999 was introduced, the mischief remained
high crime, but the chosen remedy was no longer so clear. While prosecution
of abusers was still preferred, there was a growing recognition that public
safety could be achieved through promoting social programs like the National
Domestic Violence Hotline and funding local shelters and service
providers.275 This trend continued with the passage of VAWA 2005. The
hearings on VAWA 2005 emphasized collaboration between service
providers and law enforcement to combat IPV.276
Ultimately, the U Visa was established at a turning point, when Congress
was no longer so certain that punishment was always the correct remedy to
the mischief of IPV. This Note proposes that any interpretation of the
Certification Statute should reflect the congressional realization that IPV is
not only combated by criminal courts but also by civil courts and agencies.

women [https://perma.cc/YMM4-6WNB] (“To get it passed . . . I added VAWA to a crime
bill I had been working on for years that had bipartisan support, put 100,000 cops on the streets,
and provided more assistance for law enforcement.”).
269. See GEST, supra note 258, at 244.
270. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
§ 40701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953–55 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012)).
271. See supra notes 192–95, 199 and accompanying text.
272. GEST, supra note 258, at 242.
273. Id.
274. 146 CONG. REC. S10,180 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
275. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 7–9 (statement of Hon. Diane Stuart,
Director of the Office on Violence Against Women) (“Through the spirit of [VAWA], the
coordinated community response, we have learned that victims are safer and justice is better
served when a shelter worker has a strong working relationship with law enforcement and the
district attorney, when an emergency room nurse knows to call an advocate . . . .”).
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III. U VISA CERTIFICATION IN PRACTICE
This Part surveys the current published practices surrounding family court
U Visa certification in the United States to inform this Note’s proposed
guidelines for family court U Visa certification.
The decision to certify a U Visa application is discretionary and not subject
to judicial review or judicial mandamus.277 Courts278 and agencies279 all
differ dramatically in their approaches to certification. Family courts
themselves are equally uncertain about their power to certify U Visa
applications. Some state judiciaries have issued guidance on whether family
courts can certify U Visa applications,280 and the AAO has issued one
nonprecedential decision hinting at its approval of the practice of family court
certification.281 Part III.A reviews the limited existing jurisprudence on
family court U Visa certification, Part III.B reviews current state-judiciary
guidance, and Part III.C describes the sole AAO decision discussing civil
court certification.
A. Family Court Cases Addressing U Visa Certification
There are only three published opinions that rule on whether family courts
can certify U Visa applications: all come from Queens County, New York,
two are authored by the same family court judge, and none agree—not even
the opinions written by the same judge.

277. See Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 225–27 (5th Cir. 2010).
278. Federal district courts presiding over civil proceedings are divided over whether they
possess the authority to certify U Visa applications. Compare Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville & Davidson Cty., 907 F. Supp. 2d 907, 907–14 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (granting a
motion to certify the plaintiff’s U Visa application in a section 1983 suit), and Garcia v.
Audubon Cmtys. Mgmt., LLC, No. 08-1291, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31221, at *4–13 (E.D.
La. Apr. 15, 2008) (granting a motion to certify the plaintiffs’ U Visa applications in a civil
employment litigation), with Baiju v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 12-cv-5610, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12372, at *61–71 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014) (denying a motion for U Visa certification
in a civil wage and hour suit), and Agaton v. Hosp. & Catering Servs., Inc., No. 11-1716, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46966, at *10–11 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2013) (same). In recognition that
family courts are unique in the landscape of civil courts, this Note will not discuss the issue of
federal civil court certification in depth.
279. There is similarly no uniform standard across government agencies. Compare
Memorandum from Naomi C. Earp, Chair, EEOC, to District Directors and Regional
Attorneys (July 3, 2008), http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/EEOC_procedures_
for_U_visa_certific_A9ABDA9CC5582.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YER-HJGY] (describing a
multistep interview process and the written submissions required for EEOC U Visa
certification), with How to Request a Certification for U Nonimmigrant Status (U Visa) from
the New York City Police Department (NYPD), N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/domestic_violence/u-visa-guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M
SH-R25T] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing a single request letter with four pieces of
information required: the name, the crime, the survivor’s helpfulness, and a mailing address).
280. See infra Part III.B.
281. See infra Part III.C.
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1. In re Rosales
A family court judge certified a U Visa application in In re Rosales.282
The U Visa applicant, Ms. Rosales, had previously petitioned the Queens
County Family Court for an order of protection against her abusive
husband.283 The court held an inquest and granted Ms. Rosales a final twoyear “stay away” order of protection.284 The judge that presided over the
original proceeding had since retired, and a different family court judge
certified Ms. Rosales’s U Visa application on his review of the transcript of
the inquest and her family offense petition.285 In its opinion, the court ruled,
without any analysis, that “[a] State or local Judge qualifies as a certifying
official under [the U Visa Regulation].”286
2. In re Clara F.
Three years after the decision in In re Rosales, a different family court
judge in Queens County, Judge John Hunt, declined to certify a U Visa
application. In In re Clara F.,287 the applicant, Ms. F., commenced two
family offense proceedings,288 one visitation proceeding, and one child
support proceeding in Westchester County Family Court.289 In connection
with the second family offense proceeding, the Westchester County Family
Court found that the respondent committed attempted assault in the third
degree and harassment in the second degree and entered a two-year “stay
away” order of protection in favor of Ms. F.290 However, for reasons unclear
to the Queens County Family Court judge, Ms. F.’s request for U Visa
certification was referred to Queens County.291
In refusing to honor Ms. F.’s request, the Queens County court observed
that the family offense proceeding was not a criminal one and that “the
Family Court had no role in presiding over any prosecution, conviction, or
sentencing of a defendant.”292 However, the court nevertheless directed Ms.
F. to make her request to the Westchester judge that adjudicated her family
offense petition, which implied that its denial was only the “reasoned
judgment” of the court and that other courts might reasonably rule
differently.293

282. No. Z-14920-12, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3172, at *1–2, *10 (Fam. Ct. July 22, 2013).
283. Id. at *7–9.
284. Id. at *8.
285. See id. at *7–10.
286. Id. at *1–2.
287. 32 N.Y.S.3d 871 (Fam. Ct. 2016).
288. This is the type of proceeding to seek a civil order of protection in New York State
family courts. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney 2018).
289. Clara F., 32 N.Y.S.3d at 873.
290. Id.
291. Id. (“Apparently, for reasons of ‘administrative convenience,’ the application was
referred to this Court which has had absolutely no contact with either of the parties and no
involvement with any of their judicial proceedings.”).
292. Id. at 875.
293. Id. at 875–76.
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3. In re Patricia C.
Later that year, Judge Hunt again declined a request to certify a U Visa
application in In re Patricia C.294 Five months prior to the ruling, Ms. C.
sought an order of protection from the court against her husband.295 Ms. C.’s
family offense petition described her husband’s verbal, emotional, financial,
and physical abuse.296 She also explained that she filed a report with her
local police precinct.297 At the inquest, the court found that her husband
committed aggravated harassment in the second degree and harassment in the
Second Degree, and it entered a two-year “stay away” order of protection.298
Ms. C. then applied to the family court for U Visa certification.299
In its refusal, the court explained that “[t]he Family Court is not a criminal
court and it exercises no criminal jurisdiction,” and “[t]he family offense
proceeding which was commenced by Patricia C. is a civil proceeding.”300
It further explained that, while a family offense proceeding has criminal
characteristics, the final adjudication “does not constitute a criminal
conviction.”301 The court also declined to certify Ms. C.’s U Visa application
on the basis of her involvement with the police and suggested that Ms. C.
instead bring her request directly to the police department.302
Judge Hunt’s two opinions clearly conflict: his opinion in In re Clara F.
suggests that family courts can certify U Visa applications, while his opinion
in In re Patricia C. states that family courts are never authorized to certify U
Visa applications. However, the commonalities in the two opinions are
instructive. Both make clear that the applicant has another recourse, which
implies that he might have ruled differently had there been no involvement
with another court or the police.303 And both opinions make clear that a
family offense proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.304
B. State Approaches to U Visa Certification
State judiciaries have also taken a stance on the issue of family court
U Visa certification. Representative groups of the New York and Minnesota
judiciaries have argued that family court judges may issue U Visa
certifications. On February 14, 2017, the Advisory Council on Immigration
Issues in Family Court circulated an advisory memorandum among the New
York family courts, which offered guidance on the role of the family courts
in U Visa petitions.305 The Council’s memorandum took a much more liberal
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

No. Z-19755/16, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4701, at *1, *10 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 23, 2016).
Id. at *1.
See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–4.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8–10.
See id.; In re Clara F., 32 N.Y.S.3d 871, 875–76 (Fam. Ct. 2016).
See Patricia C., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4701, at *6; Clara F., 32 N.Y.S.3d at 875.
See NY Advisory Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2–3.
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approach than that expounded in In re Clara F. and In re Patricia C. It
explains that it is well within the role of family court judges to certify U Visa
applications in a wide range of cases.306 Two years earlier, the Minnesota
Supreme Court had issued an advisory opinion allowing for the possibility
that a state court judge “presiding over a civil case such as an Order for
Protection or dissolution [of marriage] proceeding” may certify a U Visa
application, but only if the applicant is likely to be helpful in a later criminal
trial.307
C. Administrative Appeals Office Decision
The appeals office within DHS has also considered family court U Visa
certification. USCIS’s initial decision on a U Visa petition is reviewable de
novo by the AAO.308 AAO decisions are primarily nonprecedential, meaning
they “do not create or modify USCIS policy or practice” and “do not provide
a basis for applying new or alternative interpretations of law or policy.”309
The AAO has issued no precedential decisions on U Visa certification, but in
one of its nonprecedential decisions, the AAO ruled that USCIS must grant
U Visas based solely on a family court proceeding, even where the IPV
survivor refused to pursue criminal prosecution.310
In that case, a U Visa applicant sought an order of protection in family
court, spoke with the police, and refused to pursue criminal charges.311 She
submitted a certification executed by the presiding Illinois judge.312 The
certification detailed the petitioner’s cooperation in a civil-order-ofprotection proceeding.313 USCIS initially denied her U Visa application
because “obtaining a protection order, in itself, does not qualify as reporting
criminal activity.”314 The AAO reversed and held that this statement
“misstates the applicable standard.”315 The AAO also found that the
petitioner’s refusal to sign a criminal complaint, in light of the available
evidence (her testimony that she was financially dependent on her husband),
was not unreasonable and that this also misstated the applicable standard.316

306. See id.
307. Minn. Bd. on Judicial Standards, Opinion 2015-2, U-Visa Certifications 7 (June 26,
2015), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/advisory-opinions/opinion-2015-2-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6NQ-ZRL5]. One other state court system has issued an advisory opinion
on the U Visa—North Carolina—but that opinion forbade any judge from certifying U Visa
applications for reasons unrelated to the subject of this Note. See Judicial Standards Comm’n,
State of N.C., 2014-03, Formal Advisory Opinion 2–3 (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.aoc.state.
nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/JSC/14-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/99P9-ENQS].
308. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
309. USCIS, supra note 98, § 1.5.
310. Petitioner (Admin. Appeals Office Mar. 17, 2015), 2015 WL 1505717. The file
number and the petitioner’s name were redacted by USCIS. See USCIS, supra note 98, § 3.15.
311. Petitioner, 2015 WL 1505717, at *3.
312. Id. at *4.
313. See id. at *3.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at *3 n.2.
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There is clearly no consensus on whether family courts can certify U Visa
applications. The jurisprudence is unsettled, and the AAO has issued no final
determination. Undocumented IPV survivors, already vulnerable in so many
ways, need a settled legal standard.
IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: A FAMILY COURT MUST BE ABLE TO
CERTIFY THAT THE IPV SURVIVOR WAS HELPFUL
IN A PROCEEDING THAT HINGED ON A FINDING OF IPV
Part II of this Note explained that family courts are authorized to certify
U Visa applications.317 A textual analysis of the BIWPA shows there is a
limit to this authority; while on its face the statute empowers any state judge
to certify a U Visa application,318 its surrounding text somewhat narrows the
definition by requiring some kind of involvement with investigating IPV,319
protecting IPV survivors,320 or facilitating the reporting of IPV.321 The
legislative history of the BIWPA shows that the Certification Statute was a
compromise between two forces in Congress: one interested in protecting
undocumented IPV survivors and the other interested in facilitating the
cooperation of undocumented survivors with police and prosecutors.322 The
statutory history of the BIWPA, compared with the Violence Against Women
Act, shows a shift, albeit an incomplete one, from a punitive approach to
crime to a collaborative approach to intimate partner violence.323 This Part
proposes guidelines for family court U Visa certification within these
bounds.
No court or agency has yet established a framework that is supported by
the Certification Statute. The Queens County Family Court—the only court
to have published decisions on the subject—offers three different options: a
family court may unequivocally certify on the basis of observed criminal
activity,324 a family court must be presiding over the fact-finding stage of a
proceeding in order to certify an application,325 or a family court may
unequivocally not certify.326 The judicial opinions on whether a federal court
presiding over a civil proceeding can certify a U Visa application offer
another array of options for certification.327 In response to this vacuum, this
Part proposes a framework for family court U Visa certification that is
supported by the Certification Statute.
This Note proposes that to certify a U Visa application, a family court must
be able to certify that the IPV survivor was helpful in a family court
proceeding that hinged on a finding of intimate partner violence.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra Part II.
See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra notes 122–36, 201–04 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra note 278.
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By a textual analysis alone, family courts are authorized to certify U Visa
applications whether or not they are adjudicating a proceeding hinging on
IPV.328 Reading its text in a vacuum, the Certification Statute only requires
helpfulness to an investigation of criminal activity, regardless of who
conducts it.329 However, the role of the judiciary is to act as a faithful agent
of the legislature, not to interpret in a vacuum.330 Part II analyzed the purpose
of the legislature in enacting the BIWPA by looking to its legislative and
statutory histories. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to limit the ability of the government to grant U Visas while still protecting
IPV survivors.331 The statutory history indicates that the BIWPA came at a
turning point in Congress’s approach to violent crime.332 And because the
statute was written at this turning point, this Part proposes a guideline that
both balances the desire to facilitate the punishment of criminals with the
desire to stop crime and empowers IPV survivors to protect themselves.333
This proposed guideline is supported by textual interpretation that allows
family courts to certify U Visa applications, legislative history that requires
limits on that certification, and statutory history that allows those limits to be
relaxed.
Part III.A offers a framework for what constitutes intimate partner
violence, Part III.B offers a framework for what constitutes helpfulness, and
Part III.C offers a survey of which types of proceedings hinge on a finding of
intimate partner violence.
A. What Constitutes Intimate Partner Violence
This Note proposes that family court judges are only authorized to certify
U Visa applications where the intimate partner violence is in violation of
criminal statutes. Intimate partner violence encompasses a great deal of
behavior that is not codified as criminal. For example, abusers sometimes
publish intimate photos of their partners to humiliate them or exert control
over their lives, a practice called “revenge porn” or “nonconsensual
pornography.”334 Nonconsensual pornography is not illegal in every state,335
but it is clearly IPV.336
This Part proposes that family court judges should, in order to fulfill the
balance required by the Certification Statute, only certify U Visa applications

328. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
330. See Kaye, supra note 182, at 604.
331. See supra Part II.B.1.
332. See supra Part II.B.2.
333. See supra Part II.B.2.
334. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/G6RX-FXS9] (last visited Apr. 13,
2018).
335. See 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/4C9S-4HXW] (last
visited Apr. 13, 2018).
336. See Citron & Franks, supra note 334, at 351.
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when there is a violation of existing criminal law. Since the decision to
certify a U Visa is committed solely to the discretion of the certifying
authority,337 how a family court judge determines a violation of existing
criminal law should be left to her discretion.
B. What Constitutes Helpfulness
This Part offers examples of what actions survivors can take to meet the
helpfulness requirement of the Certification Statute, including filing initial
family court pleadings, testifying in family court, and entering into settlement
agreements with their abuser.
First, filing initial pleadings is helpful. An investigation is a broad and
systematic inquiry.338 IPV survivors who petition the court for relief from
IPV are initiating that systematic inquiry. A family court may certify a
U Visa application at this early pleading stage. Not only has the IPV survivor
already been helpful but the filing indicates a willingness on the part of the
survivor to be helpful in the future at the fact-finding stages. Even if the
petition is withdrawn, as is often the situation in IPV cases,339 the survivor
has indicated a willingness to be helpful.
Second, testifying in family court is helpful. It takes tremendous bravery
for IPV survivors to testify in open court about their abuse. By testifying
about their abuse, survivors are helping family courts in the fact-finding
process. In fact, most family court proceedings call for testimony to aid in
making a final determination.340 IPV survivors who testify about their abuse
at any point meet the helpfulness element.
Finally, entering into a settlement agreement is helpful. IPV survivors who
testify or file a pleading demonstrate helpfulness with family court
investigation even if they reach a settlement. Settlement indicates, at
minimum, a willingness to be helpful in the investigation of criminal activity
in two ways. First, a survivor who settles with her abuser has still likely
detailed the IPV she suffered in her initial pleadings. Second, entering into
a settlement agreement plausibly indicates a willingness to enforce that
agreement. It is a crime to violate orders of protection (even those entered
on consent),341 custody agreements,342 and child support agreements.343 A
survivor who enters into one of these agreements thus has indicated a
willingness to pursue these criminal penalties in the event of violation.
337. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1068–
70 (1993).
340. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 832, 835 (McKinney 2018) (requiring a fact-finding
hearing before entering a final order of protection).
341. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (2018) (providing that violating a protective order
is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment).
342. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (West 2017) (providing that violating a
custody order is a felony).
343. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.05–.06 (McKinney 2018) (providing that refusal to
pay child support is a class A misdemeanor or class E felony).
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C. Which Proceedings Hinge on a Finding
of Intimate Partner Violence
This Part outlines certain proceedings where a family court is investigating
criminal activity and is therefore authorized to certify a litigant’s U Visa
application. Family law is a matter of state law.344 Therefore, which types
of proceedings hinge on a finding of IPV vary from state to state. This Part
analyzes a few different types of proceedings that would qualify under this
framework based on the laws of three of the states with the highest numbers
of undocumented people: California, Texas, and New York.345
Every state has some version of a civil order of protection that is intended
to aid survivors of intimate partner violence.346 Statutory requirements vary,
but family court judges typically must make a factual or legal determination
that IPV occurred or is imminent.347 For example, in California, a family
court must find that there is “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse”
before entering a protective order.348 Family courts adjudicating an order of
protection are always empowered to certify a U Visa of the petitioner because
these proceedings always hinge on a finding of intimate partner violence.
A family court judge is also authorized to certify U Visa applications in
certain state divorce proceedings. Every state has some version of no-fault
divorce.349 However, most state no-fault divorce laws require a finding of
something like “‘irreconcilable differences’ or ‘irretrievable breakdown of
the marriage’” before granting a divorce.350 If intimate partner violence is
argued as a basis for that irretrievable breakdown, this Part proposes that the
presiding family court judge is authorized to certify a U Visa application.
Some states enacted no-fault divorce law to supplement the fault schemes.351
For example, in Texas, cruelty is a ground for divorce.352 Cruelty is
established by “[a]ny conduct of one spouse sufficient to raise a reasonable
fear of bodily harm in the other,”353 including physical and verbal abuse,354
threats,355 and sexual abuse.356 Ultimately, a family court adjudicating a
344. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
345. See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR.,
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/5PATE5BV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
346. See Nawal H. Ammar et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the United States and
Protection Orders: An Exploratory Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337, 338 (2012).
347. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 339, at 1043–48.
348. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300 (2017).
349. FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 4.02 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2017).
350. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1922 (2012); see, e.g., TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2017) (“[T]he court may grant a divorce without regard to
fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities
that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable
expectation of reconciliation.”).
351. See, e.g., 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2270 (2017).
352. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.002.
353. 39 TEX. JUR. 3D Family Law § 353 (2017).
354. See id.
355. Id. § 355.
356. See id. § 357.
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divorce where the divorce could only be granted on a finding of IPV, as in
the no-fault or fault-based schemes described above, is authorized to certify
a U Visa application.
Some states require that courts consider IPV in custody and visitation
determinations.357 Where an IPV survivor is helpful in a custody and
visitation proceeding in which IPV is alleged and investigated—where, for
example, she describes IPV in her custody petition or testifies to IPV in the
adjudication—the family court is authorized to certify her U Visa
application.
Family court determinations of spousal and child support can also hinge
on IPV.358 However, this is rare. In New York, only “egregious conduct” is
relevant in fixing a domestic support obligation359—for example, in Stevens
v. Stevens,360 an intermediate appellate court in New York affirmed a
downward modification of spousal support where the recipient was
physically abusive, verbally abusive, and unfaithful in the marriage.361
Family courts adjudicating domestic support proceedings should, thus, only
certify U Visa applications in the rare case where IPV is a factor considered
by the court.
Family court determinations of paternity can also, in rare cases, consider
IPV. California law recognizes multiple types of legal fathers.362 Biology is
not the determinative factor, and courts may consider domestic violence in
granting paternal rights.363 However, in New York, paternity is established
solely by biology, which can be proven by DNA testing or by evidence of a
sexual relationship between the parents around the time of conception.364 In
a state like New York, a family court should not certify a U Visa application
for a parent who testifies about intimate partner violence during a paternity
proceeding because it has no weight in judicial analysis. However, a court
may certify a U Visa application for the parent that testifies about IPV during
a California-style paternity proceeding, where the proceeding may hinge on
that testimony.
CONCLUSION
Undocumented IPV survivors are in an incredibly vulnerable position.
Survivors are often in immediate physical danger from their abusers who use
the survivors’ immigration status as a weapon. And there are often many
obstacles barring undocumented survivors from seeking assistance.
357. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West
2017).
358. See, e.g., In re Denton, No. G044821, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2328, at *26–
28 (Mar. 27, 2012).
359. 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2577 (2017).
360. 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1985).
361. See id. at 710.
362. In re P.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 2011) (“There are three types of
fathers in juvenile dependency law: presumed, biological, and alleged.”).
363. See id. at 561–65 (declining to automatically grant parental rights to a child’s
biological father despite genetic testing results).
364. See 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 903 (2017).
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Obtaining temporary legal status allows survivors to access that assistance.
The BIWPA was intended to facilitate this access.
Although the law enforcement certification requirement restricts who can
access the U Visa, statutory interpretation shows that this requirement was
not intended to bar immigration relief to survivors who choose to protect
themselves and their families by going to family court instead of approaching
a prosecutor. Legal authorities should recognize that family courts may
certify U Visa applications where the IPV survivor was, is, or is likely to be
helpful in a proceeding hinging on a finding of intimate partner violence.
This Note recommends guidelines for U Visa certification in the hopes that
IPV advocates will be able to obtain certification for as many clients as
possible, that family courts will confidently certify the U Visa applications
of its litigants, and that as many undocumented survivors as possible will be
able to overcome one more unnecessary obstacle to safety and obtain legal
status.

